The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong — Background and Themes

Opening Framing and the Lecture’s Occasion

The opening pages establish the work’s dual character: a public lecture and a condensed philosophical statement. Brentano explicitly connects his address to Ihering’s earlier talk on the origin of the sense of right, but insists his essay is “not only a fugitive, occasional study.” The preface warns against assuming superficiality from its incidental origin. For a first reader, this framing signals that the argument is both accessible and deeply considered. The translator’s note further contextualizes the text as a collaborative effort, with careful oversight from Marty and Alexander. This paratextual material—preface, translator’s note, and contents—provides a roadmap: the lecture itself, followed by notes that expand on key points, and an appendix on subjectless propositions that Brentano claims bears on the main inquiry. Readers should attend to how the lecture’s brevity is supplemented by the notes, which often contain crucial clarifications and historical references.

Engagement with Aristotle and Hume in the Middle Excerpts

In the middle of the text, Brentano critically examines historical positions on the nature of the good and moral feeling. He contrasts Aristotle’s recognition of a “right and a wrong kind of desire” with what he sees as Aristotle’s later error of believing “we can know the good as good, independent of the excitation of the emotions.” Brentano notes that Aristotle, in the Nicomachean Ethics, denies that every pleasure is good, yet elsewhere suggests a unity of the good only by analogy. Against this, Brentano praises Hume, the “moralist of sentiment,” for urging that one cannot recognize something as lovable without experiencing love. This section reveals Brentano’s method: he uses historical figures not as authorities but as interlocutors, identifying both insights and mistakes. The reader should note how Brentano’s own view emerges through these critiques—he is building a position that emotions are essential to moral knowledge, yet not all emotions are equally valid. The discussion of “ethical subjectivism” and its analogy to Protagorean relativism is a key thread.

The Argument Against Simple Pleasure as the Criterion

Later in the lecture, Brentano directly challenges the idea that every act of simple pleasure is right. He argues that feelings can take “an opposed attitude towards the same phenomenon,” and that higher pleasures may conflict with instinctive repulsions. He points out that advocates of the simple-pleasure view themselves admit that different individuals have opposite preferences, and that one is right and the other wrong—a contradiction. This line of reasoning is central to Brentano’s project: he seeks a criterion for distinguishing correct from incorrect emotions. The reader should observe how Brentano uses examples—such as “dislike for desire, or desire for dislike”—to illustrate the complexity of emotional attitudes. The argument is dense but proceeds by logical steps, often invoking distinctions from Aristotle and Hume. The notes, referenced in the text (e.g., note 32, p. 92), likely contain further elaboration; a first reading may benefit from consulting them to follow the full thread.

Structure and the Role of the Appendix

The text’s structure is unusual: a lecture, followed by extensive notes, and an appendix on “Miklosich on Subjectless Propositions.” Brentano claims this appendix bears on “inquiries apparently so remote,” promising that its relevance will become evident. For a first reader, this appendix may seem tangential, but it reflects Brentano’s broader philosophical method—connecting logic, psychology, and ethics. The notes themselves are not mere footnotes but substantive expansions, often containing historical references and counterarguments. The translator’s note indicates that the essay was “written during short intervals of leisure” and supervised by Marty, suggesting a layered composition. Readers should approach the text as a whole, moving between lecture, notes, and appendix to grasp Brentano’s full argument. The presence of a list of corrected typographical errors also indicates careful editorial work, though the text itself is presented as a faithful reproduction of the original 1902 edition.

For a first reading, it is advisable to read the lecture straight through, then return to the notes as they are referenced. The appendix on subjectless propositions may be saved for last, as its connection to the main argument becomes clearer after grasping Brentano’s core claims about emotional evidence and moral knowledge. The text rewards attention to its historical dialogues and logical structure, rather than a search for simple conclusions.