The Basis of Morality — Key Ideas to Explore

A Polemical Critique of Kant

Part II of the essay is a sustained attack on Kant's ethics. Schopenhauer challenges the imperative form, the notion of duties toward oneself, and the categorical imperative itself. He argues that Kant's system is abstract and detached from human experience, relying on a "commanding tone" that has no basis in reality. The critique is detailed and often withering: Schopenhauer accuses Kant of creating a "magnifying glass" for errors, which Fichte later enlarged. He does not merely dismiss Kant but engages closely with his texts, pointing out inconsistencies and what he sees as logical flaws. For instance, he questions how a purely rational imperative can motivate action, given that human beings are driven by feelings and desires. This section is essential for understanding Schopenhauer's own positive project, as he clears the ground by rejecting what he considers a false foundation.

Compassion as the Only True Moral Incentive

In Part III, Schopenhauer presents his own basis for morality: compassion (Mitleid). He argues that all actions of moral worth spring from a direct participation in another's suffering. This is not a sentimental claim but a philosophical one, supported by a careful analysis of human motives. He distinguishes between egoistic and malicious incentives and shows that only compassion can overcome them. The virtues of justice and loving-kindness are derived from this single root: justice restrains us from harming others, while loving-kindness actively impels us to help. Schopenhauer insists that this foundation is empirical, observable in everyday life, unlike Kant's a priori principles. He provides examples and anticipates objections, maintaining that compassion is the "primal ethical phenomenon" that any metaphysical explanation must account for.

Conscience: A Composite of Fear and Prejudice

Schopenhauer's treatment of conscience is characteristically iconoclastic. He dissects the common notion of conscience as an innate moral guide, arguing instead that it is largely a product of external influences. In a striking passage, he breaks it down into "about one-fifth, fear of men; one-fifth, superstition; one-fifth, prejudice; one-fifth, vanity; and one-fifth, habit." He illustrates this with examples: a bigoted Jew feeling guilt for smoking on the Sabbath, or an officer tormented by a code of "knightly honour" while breaking promises without a second thought. Schopenhauer does not deny that genuine moral feelings exist, but he insists that what people call conscience is often a hodgepodge of social conditioning. This skeptical view serves to clear the way for his own account of morality, which is grounded not in an inner voice but in the direct experience of another's suffering.

Readers approaching The Basis of Morality should be prepared for a combative, rigorous argument that rewards close attention. Schopenhauer's prose is vivid and often caustic, but his reasoning is precise. The essay is best read alongside the critiques of Kant it engages, though the translator's notes provide helpful context. Pay particular attention to how Schopenhauer moves from negative critique to positive construction—the shift in tone and method is as instructive as the conclusions themselves.