A Handbook of Ethical Theory — Key Ideas to Explore

The Two-Part Structure: Accepted Content and Scientific Ethics

The table of contents divides the book into four parts, but the first two establish the core architecture. Part I, “The Accepted Content of Morals,” asks whether there is substantial agreement on moral rules and examines the codes of communities (justice, veracity, the common good) and of moralists (Epicurean, Stoic, Plato, Aristotle). Part II, “Ethics as Science,” shifts to method: inductive and deductive reasoning, the authority of the “given,” and the aim of ethics as an appeal to reason. This structure suggests Fullerton believes one must first understand what people actually hold as moral before subjecting those beliefs to scientific scrutiny. The excerpts from later chapters on intuitionism and egoism confirm that he never abandons the concrete content for abstract theory alone.

Intuitions as Both Guide and Object of Critique

In Chapter XXIII, Fullerton defends moral intuitions as “the very guide of life” and credits them with giving societies stability and orderly development. Yet he immediately warns that the scientific moralist must study them critically, regarding them “not as something fixed and changeless, but as living and developing.” He illustrates the tension by citing Butler’s maxim that justice should be done though the heavens fall, then noting that the philosophical intuitionist must consider the risk of bringing down the heavens. The key problem: if intuitions can conflict, how do we distinguish authoritative ones? Fullerton’s answer is not to discard intuitions but to treat them as a basis for reasoning, not as final arbiters.

Egoism Defined Through Historical Examples

Fullerton approaches egoism by first acknowledging that terms like “happiness,” “good,” and “self” are ambiguous. He then turns to “terrible examples”: Aristippus the Cyrenaic, who made corporeal pleasure the end and viewed friends as useful, and Thomas Hobbes, who held that every voluntary act aims at the agent’s own good. By presenting these clear cases, Fullerton establishes a baseline before examining more doubtful forms of egoism. His method is taxonomic: he defines by contrast, using historical doctrines to sharpen the concept. The excerpts do not reveal his final assessment of egoism, but they show a commitment to precise definition and to letting the historical record supply the evidence.

Readers approaching Fullerton’s handbook should expect a work that moves from descriptive ethics (what people believe) to normative theory (what they ought to believe), all in plain language. The excerpts suggest the author values clarity over novelty and respects moral tradition while insisting on critical examination. Because the excerpts cover only parts of the book, the reader cannot infer Fullerton’s final position on egoism or intuitionism; the value lies in watching a careful philosopher lay out the terms of debate.