The Concept of Nature The Tarner Lectures Delivered in Trinity College, November 1919 — Story, Setting & Ideas
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Whitehead opens his 1919 Tarner Lectures by warning readers that the existing technical terminology of philosophy is shot through with a fallacy he calls 'bifurcation.' He insists that unless the reader avoids this 'facile vice,' not a word of his book will be intelligible. The lectures retain their original spoken form, a choice Whitehead defends by noting that an audience will 'construe whatever you say into conformity with their pre-existing outlook.' This rhetorical strategy—anticipating and blocking misinterpretation—shapes the entire work.
The excerpts reveal a distinctive authorial voice: precise, occasionally wry, and fond of concrete examples. When discussing motion, Whitehead declares that 'my conservatism resolutely opposes the identification of momentum and moonshine.' Such moments of dry humor leaven dense argument. He also uses biblical allusion—'Abraham in his wanderings left his birthplace where it had ever been'—to ground abstract claims about rest and absolute position in familiar narrative.
The Fallacy of Bifurcation
Whitehead's central methodological claim is that modern natural philosophy has been corrupted by 'bifurcation'—the splitting of nature into two realms: one of primary qualities (supposedly objective) and another of secondary qualities (supposedly subjective). He argues that this division makes his own thesis unintelligible. The term 'bifurcation' appears repeatedly as a diagnostic tool, and Whitehead uses it to dismiss entire traditions of thought without engaging their details. In the preface, he writes that 'all its technical terms in some subtle way presuppose a misunderstanding of my thesis.' This sweeping claim is characteristic of his approach: he does not argue against rival views point by point but instead declares them fundamentally misguided.
The excerpts do not provide a full definition of bifurcation, but the pattern is clear: Whitehead identifies a pervasive error, names it, and then proceeds to build an alternative framework that he claims avoids it entirely. Readers should note that his critique is directed at the assumptions underlying scientific language, not at empirical results.
Motion, Rest, and Absolute Position
Whitehead takes motion as an 'axiom'—a physical fact that we perceive directly. He insists that 'motion presupposes rest' and that a theory of motion and a theory of rest are 'the same thing viewed from different aspects.' This leads him to defend a concept of absolute position, which he argues is compatible with relativity if one admits 'alternative time-systems.' Each time-system, he claims, has its own 'timeless space' and its own definition of absolute position. The argument is technical and relies on a distinction between the 'four-dimensional manifold of event-particles' (an extension of thought beyond observation) and the direct 'sense-awareness' of relations between events.
Whitehead's diction here is careful: he speaks of 'event-particles' and 'timeless space' as constructs, not givens. He warns that looking for evidence of absolute position in the manifold is futile because 'we shall find nothing in it except what we have put there.' This self-consciousness about the role of thought in shaping scientific concepts is a hallmark of his method.
The Role of 'Here' and Sense-Awareness
Whitehead grounds his theory in what he calls 'the percept of being here.' He describes an event as 'a factor in a determinate complex' that always includes two ingredients: a 'duration' (all nature present now) and a 'locus standi for mind'—the 'here' of sense-awareness. This 'here' is not a point in space but an 'event here,' a definite factor in nature that serves as 'the focus in nature for that' awareness. The sentence breaks off in the excerpt, but the direction is clear: Whitehead is trying to derive spatial concepts from the immediate experience of being situated.
His language is deliberately non-technical at this stage, using terms like 'focus' and 'factor' rather than established philosophical jargon. He contrasts this approach with theories that 'vitiate immediate intuition'—a phrase that echoes his earlier warning about bifurcation. The reader is meant to trust their own sense-awareness as a starting point, even if theory later complicates it.
Rhetoric and Audience in the Lecture Form
Whitehead explicitly designed these lectures to prevent 'the reader from bolting up side tracks in pursuit of misunderstandings.' The first two and last two chapters, he says, are 'essential for intelligibility though they hardly add to the formal completeness of the exposition.' This admission reveals a strategic approach to argument: he is less concerned with systematic deduction than with reshaping the reader's conceptual framework. The lecture form allows him to anticipate objections and redirect attention.
His tone varies from professorial authority ('I assume it as an axiom') to playful defiance ('my conservatism resolutely opposes the identification of momentum and moonshine'). The biblical reference to Abraham is one of few concrete illustrations; Whitehead generally prefers abstract argument. Readers should be prepared for a text that demands close attention to its own terminology and that repeatedly warns against misinterpretation.
These lectures reward readers who attend to Whitehead's precise diction and his habit of naming fallacies before constructing alternatives. The excerpts show a thinker who is acutely aware of how language shapes thought and who is willing to coin new terms—'bifurcation,' 'event-particle,' 'timeless space'—to escape inherited confusions. Because the text retains its spoken rhythm, it can be read aloud profitably. Approach it as a series of arguments designed to unsettle assumptions, not as a finished system.
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